Newsletter: Iraq War Raises Difficult Questions

Iraq War Raises Difficult Questions
February 12, 2007

The issues and problems surrounding the current conflict in Iraq are so difficult and complex that I cannot hope to do them justice in this rough summary. On the outset, it may be tempting to throw one’s hands in the air and declare the issues too complex to comprehend and to shut oneself off from the news from the region altogether. I have succumbed to this temptation before, but more recently I have decided that it’s better to confront the issue openly and to piece together the best understanding I can. I don’t pretend to be an expert. What I hope to accomplish with this newsletter is to provide a rough summary of the issues confronting Iraq and our own country for those of us who have avoided the issue and for anyone who is interested in engaging in an open discussion about the difficult options before us.
The situation in Iraq has gone from bad to worse in recent months. Sectarian violence has spurred a cycle of bloodshed that cannot be expected to cease until national reconciliation is achieved among the warring segments of the Iraqi population. Almost daily Sunni Arab insurgent attacks on Shia civilians spark reprisal. In response to deadly attacks from Sunni insurgents, equally brutal Shia militias and death squads have formed and are killing Sunni civilians at rates matching that of Shia deaths from Sunni attacks. More than 34,000 Iraqi civilians were killed in 2006 alone.[1] Militias on both sides have been forcing members of the other sect from their homes in an effort to make areas safe for their own. Iraqis from both religious sects have fled their neighborhoods to areas where their sect has a majority. The United Nations estimates that there are about 1.6 million people displaced within Iraq, and that a larger number still, 1.8 million, have fled the country all together.[2] This sectarian cleansing has been particularly bad in Baghdad, where there is virtually no Sunni representation in the city’s provincial government. Once diverse neighborhoods are quickly becoming Shia-dominated as Sunnis flee either by choice or by force.[3] Many Sunnis fear that the government has deliberately done nothing to stop violence on Sunnis from Shia militias, most notably, Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army.
It has become increasingly unclear what role United States forces should play in Iraq. Polls show that a majority of Americans now favor withdrawal.[4] Even so, on January 10, President Bush called for a deployment of 21,500 additional U.S. troops to Iraq. U.S. Defense officials say that Bush hopes that an increased level of American troops may be able to suppress sectarian attacks in Baghdad long enough that Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki may be able to convince Sadr to halt his militia’s attacks on Sunni civilians.[5] Once a settlement is reached, Iraq’s Sunnis may be convinced to throw their support behind the national government. Unfortunately, there are reasons to think that Maliki won’t follow through on his part. Despite his promises to the contrary, Maliki, a Shia, has little interest in opposing Sadr, whose political bloc helped bring Maliki to power. With the government unable to control attacks from Sunni insurgents, many Shia have turned to Sadr’s Mahdi Army for protection. For Maliki to move against the Mahdi Army and other Shia militias instead of focusing on the Sunni insurgents, he would risk losing the support and trust of Iraq’s Shia population. So Maliki has done little to stop Shia militias. In fact, he has often prevented U.S. troops from pursuing Mahdi Army militants and has intervened several times to secure the release of Sadr’s supporters.[6]
The question of how to proceed is a difficult one. Withdrawal of U.S. troops could result in further destabilization. The Saudi government, for example, which opposes U.S. withdrawal of troops for fear that their absence will allow for the slaughter of Iraq’s Sunnis, has said that they will fund and support Sunni interests in a civil war in Iraq if the U.S. pulls out its troops.[7] Thus, the civil war in Iraq may turn into a regional proxy-war between Saudi Arabia and the Shia governments of Iran and Syria who have already backed Shia interests in Iraq.
However, sending more troops into Iraq could be even worse. If Maliki succeeds in channeling U.S. forces to attack only Sunni militias, sectarian tensions would worsen. More and more, Sunnis are viewing Iraq’s national government as a Shia sectarian regime with the illicit backing of the United States.
This war should never have happened. It was conceived in warped ideology, sold on false assertions, and carried out with incompetence. Unfortunately, it cannot be taken back. As the Earlham College Democrats, we oppose the United States taking sides in a civil war that is beyond our understanding and control. We believe that the best possible approach for peace lies in a political, not a military, solution. For these reasons, we believe Bush’s decision to send more troops is misguided.



[1] Sabrina Tavernise. “Iraqi Death Toll Exceeded 34,000 in 2006, U.N. Says.” The New York Times. Jan. 16, 2007. A1.
[2] The Iraq Study Group Report. p. 4
[3] Sabrina Tavernise; Hosham Hussein; and Qai Mizher. “District by District, Shiites Make Baghdad Their Own.” The New York Times. Dec. 23, 2006.
[4] http://www.pollingreport.com/iraq.htm
[5] Michael Hirsh and Richard Wolffe. “With Friends Like These.” Newsweek. Jan. 29, 2007. p. 31
[6] Ibid. p. 31
[7] Helene Cooper; Hassan M. Fattah. “Saudis Give U.S. A Grim What If.” The New York Times. Dec 13, 2006.